A year ago we were looking back at the first week of Sudan's Civil War. Ever the enigma wrapped in a blanket then weighted and dropped into deep water; only some of the rhetoric has really moved any appreciable distance. This will be a now rare posting (of an historical perspective) from my favorite Sudan source (Catcher in Sudan) that was published on the 15th and a few articles and news snips since then to try and redevelop a sense of what's happening in that mostly forgotten sphere.
From Catcher 4/15/24:
🔸Anniversary of the war in Sudan. Material from our valiant military commander
Part one
Our small but close-knit team could tell a lot about the events in Sudan. We tried to convey to our compatriots at least some information about what was really happening in the capital of Sudan. So much has accumulated that on the first anniversary of the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RRF there is not much to tell. Let's try anyway.
Who knows, maybe the main drama of the beginning of hostilities in Sudan was that most people understood their inevitability, but believed in some kind of miracle. The escalation of the acute phase of the conflict between the “two generals” (in fact, the causes of the conflict are not only, and not so much in personalities) proceeded slowly but steadily. Back at the end of 2022, one way or another, information was circulating about the preparation of army units and the RRF for the decisive battle: the army for a monopoly on power, and the RRF for survival. It is not customary to talk about this now. It is customary to call some the Sudanese Armed Forces, and others – rebels. Until 9 a.m. local time on April 15, 2023, things were different. The current state of affairs, of course, includes politics, which rarely calls a spade a spade.
For four years, the Sudanese doubted, but still hoped for the prudence of the “revolutionary forces” that took power. It is important to note that not a single process within the framework of dismantling the power of the Islamists has been fully completed. In October 2021, the so-called “civilians” were again replaced by the military.
It was after the events of October 25, 2021 that the potential for conflict within the security bloc began to grow significantly. Above them there was no separate leader, no law, no external force that could at least somehow regulate the relations between them.
The cornerstone and a kind of finishing line before the start of the conflict were the “Framework Agreements” and the issue of reform of the security forces. The reform ran in parallel with the Framework Agreements, and was supposed to clearly define the structure and status of the armed forces. This could not have happened without Western “consultants” who, right at the meetings and on the sidelines of the forum on “reform of security forces,” tried to talk about how to properly unite the army and the RRF.
The paradox was that all proposals for reform linked to the Framework Agreements only fueled mutual hostility between the army and the RRF. Each side at the forum heard only what it wanted to hear, namely, representatives of the Armed Forces considered the complete subordination of the RRF to them as the main thesis, and representatives of the RRF considered the thesis that the reform would be carried out over 10 years and would subordinate the security forces to the civilian government. In essence, we were talking about a stalemate, which did not suit the army generals at all. On the night of April 6-7, 2023, an extraordinary meeting of the commanders of the military branches was convened, during which al-Burhan was given an ultimatum: either he closes the issue of the RRF joining the Armed Forces by any means, or he loses the post of chairman of the Sovereign Council, and is subject to arrested as a state criminal. According to some reports, on the morning of April 7, al-Burhan requested by telephone from the President of Egypt (al-Burhan had been flirting with Egypt for a long time) for reinforcements in the form of aviation and special forces to carry out operations to contain the RRF, as well as the arrest and possible physical liquidation of Daglo. Then there was a banal information leak, and SBR intelligence received information about the arrival of several military aircraft, including special forces units, at the Merowe airfield (Nile River State) in the coming week. On the evening of April 12, RRF units without a fight took control of the Merowe airfield, which by that time housed several military aircraft of the Egyptian Air Force, and a military transport aircraft with special forces (a separate story is how the RRF later transferred people and equipment to the Egyptians, and how this was presented in Egyptian media). The army leadership, and al-Burhan in particular, faces the threat of accusations of violating Sudan's sovereignty. Thus, the leadership of the Armed Forces had nothing to lose. The RRF was given an ultimatum: to leave the Merowe airfield within 48 hours.
Part two
At the same time, in Khartoum, on the night of April 14-15, at an emergency meeting of the commanders of the military branches, it was decided to prepare a decree signed by the chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council on the dissolution of the RRF and the outlawing of their units. On the morning of April 15, headquarters officers, accompanied by detachments of the Sudanese Armed Forces, were supposed to convey al-Burhan’s decree to the commanders of the RRF detachments in Khartoum. In turn, the commander of the RRF Daglo gave the order not to obey al-Burhan’s orders and to return fire in the event of attacks by the Sudanese Armed Forces. On April 15, at 9.15 a.m. local time, units of the Sudanese Armed Forces began storming RRF bases located on the outskirts of Khartoum. During the day, fighting with the use of heavy equipment, artillery and aircraft spread into city neighborhoods.
The first minutes of the fighting were heard by the whole of Khartoum. Literally 40 minutes later, black smoke began to rise on the outskirts of the capital, and from the high-rise building where our makeshift checkpoint was located it was clearly visible. One after another, in a chain reaction, more and more new units entered the battles. The situation was aggravated by the fact that most of the RRF bases were located in close proximity to the bases of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Hundreds of people leaving the capital. Mostly old people, women and children. For some reason, during the entire period of my stay in battle-torn Khartoum, this was the most difficult sight. It’s worth noting again: society didn’t believe it, but it was ready. The fighting reached the center of the capital in a matter of hours, and some of the fiercest battles took place around the airport. The same objects, streets, high-rise buildings change hands several times. The civilian population most often died either when they found themselves on the line of direct contact between the parties to the conflict, or from stray bullets and incorrect targeting of artillery weapons. A separate conversation about the so-called “truce”, the terms of which have never been fully observed by either side.
An urban agglomeration of several million people found itself hostage to the cynical games of those who were preparing to ensure the security of the country and its people. Time will tell which of the security officials was right, because history is written by the victors.🔸
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Some other interesting (or useful) perspectives:
Excerpts: “…Despite the public rhetoric of Washington, seemingly being in support of safeguarding Sudanese civilians and a democratic future, with its strong condemnations of the ongoing widespread massacres and sexual abuse, the US government and its allies are largely the reason for the country’s civil war. When the de-facto Sudanese leader and head of its military, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, ordered airstrikes on positions associated with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), triggering the ongoing conflict in Sudan, the US threw its hands up in the air and Western media attempted to blame Russia’s Wagner group. …
The Israel Connection
At a time when the Sudanese people needed international support the most, the US thought not of democracy, but of how they could use this moment to add Sudan to the list of Arab nations who would normalize ties with Tel Aviv. In 2020, the US Trump administration jumped to apply all possible pressure upon the TMC, in order to have them join the so-called “Abraham Accords“, succeeding in fulfilling this goal. In February of 2020, a secret meeting took place between the head of the Sudanese military, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, in Uganda.
While mainstream media outlets like The New York Times attempted to suggest that the US was helping Sudan transition to democracy and that the nation’s prospects were seeming hopeful prior to April 2023, the very opposite was true. The US, under the Trump administration, had bribed the TMC to accept normalization with Israel and not bothered to attach any demands for internal reform to its bribes. For instance, in return for normalizing with the Israelis, the US offered to remove Sudan from its State-sponsor of terrorism list, meaning that assets would be unfrozen and sanctions lifted. This, as then US Treasury Secretary, Steven Mnuchin, signed an agreement to clear Sudan’s 1.2 billion dollars of debt owed to the World Bank.
…Israel is, however, playing both sides of this conflict. The Israeli Foreign Ministry initially joined Egypt in backing Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, while the Mossad [Israeli intelligence agency] has supported Hemedti. There have even been debates between Israeli leaders as to which side they should choose, as the issue of control in Sudan is so vital. While Hemedti is a natural ally to the Israelis and has openly advocated normalization of ties since October of 2020, especially due to his opposition to the Islamic Movement in Sudan, in the event he loses the conflict Israel could potentially encounter a problem. This is why Tel Aviv has even offered to be the mediator and ostensibly broker peace between both sides — as it boasts close ties with both.” (eerily familiar, methinks.)
https://www.thelastamericanvagabond.com/us-israeli-hand-sudan-civil-war/🔸
Sudan: Four Priorities for Sudan a Year Into the Civil War
[USIP] A devastating humanitarian crisis and the risk of regional war demand a new approach from the international community.
This week marks a year of war in Sudan. A once promising revolution that led to the overthrow in 2019 of the country's longtime dictator, Omar al-Bashir, has devolved into a devastating civil war. The fighting started over a dispute on how to incorporate the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into the country's military, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). A year later as the conflict
Read More🔸
🇸🇩🇷🇺 Sudan's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) is closely associated with foreign mercenaries and political migrants from among local democrats and their external sponsors. According to some estimates, three quarters of today's rebels are fighters from African countries.
This opinion was expressed by the Russian Ambassador to Sudan Andrei Chernovol. According to him, the current war in the country was caused by a number of factors.
“The first time bomb under the foundation of Sudanese statehood was laid by the Westerners with their democratization project back in 2019 after the dismantling of the Omar al-Bashir regime. Obsessive attempts to adapt Sudan to neoliberal standards that are deeply alien to the country’s population naturally led to a deep political and socio-economic crisis.”
The final straw was the Western-backed framework agreement concluded on December 22, 2022, which was promoted by then UN envoy Volker Perthes.
“It implied the transfer of power to a Western-backed deactivator. Not only did this document not pay enough attention to the most sensitive issues of the internal Sudanese settlement, including the reform of the security forces, but also its implementation was pushed through in the shortest possible time, without regard to the key problems that remained unresolved.”
Chernovol named the main problem of this agreement as the clause on the speedy integration of the RRF into the army. It was unacceptable to the Westerners, who used the RRF as a force cover to keep them in power.
“When the military refused to follow the lead of the Westerners, the green light was given for the forceful overthrow of the intractable generals by the hands of the RRF. However, the bet on "blitzkrieg" failed. Subsequently, against the backdrop of mass crimes against civilians, Sudanese society unconditionally supported the national army, around which all patriotic forces rallied, including former Darfur rebels. The RRF became firmly associated with foreign mercenaries, comprador political emigration from among the local democrats and their external sponsors.” Arab Africa🔸
🗞RECENT NEWS📰
Sudan's Prosecutor General's Office charges Hamdok with "incitement of war"
Prosecutors in Port Sudan have charged former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok with "inciting war against the state" and other charges that could carry the death penalty. Criminal cases have also been opened against 16 other leaders of the civil organization Taqaddum. t.me/CatcherInSudan🔸
🔸🇸🇩 🇷🇺 Another event contributing to the renewed cooperation between Russia and Sudan.
Russian authorities have initiated the delivery of diesel fuel to Sudan. As per monitoring resources, two tankers transported 70 thousand tons to Port Sudan after loading at the Port of Primorsk.
The significance of this gesture cannot be overstated, as some of the most intense battles between the Sudanese government and the RRF occur over fuel and energy facilities, resulting in a perpetual fuel shortage.
Naturally, this news has garnered significant media attention, setting a promising stage for strengthening ties with the Sudanese government amidst renewed discussions about establishing a logistics center for the Russian Navy in the Red Sea. The key is not to overlook this opportunity again.
#Africa #Russia #Sudan
@rybar Original msg🔸
🇬🇧🇸🇩 UK foreign office is in secret talks with Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, report reveals
The British media outlet have disclosed that UK officials are conducting discreet talks with the Rapid Support Forces, a Sudanese paramilitary group that has been engaged in conflict alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces for a year and has been implicated in systematic ethnic cleansing in the country during the past year.
Details of a meeting held last month between UK representatives and the RSF were uncovered through a freedom of information request, as revealed by the media.
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) has acknowledged making and successfully establishing contact with RSF representatives, the response indicated. However, it was also noted that there has not yet been a direct meeting between UK officials and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the RSF commander, according to the report.
t.me/sputnik_africa🔸
‘Humanitarian aid in Sudan is constantly being blocked by all the belligerents’
With the international community having pledged more than €2 billion in funding for Sudan at a humanitarian conference in Paris on Monday, Norwegian Refugee Council Sudan Advocacy Manager Mathilde Vu breaks down the worsening humanitarian crisis in a country devastated by a year of brutal fighting.
👉 Read more: https://f24.my/AGNN.g🔸
Sudan: President El Burhan Fires Foreign Minister, Governors
[Dabanga] Lt Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan, commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and head of Sudan's Sovereignty Council, has dismissed and replaced Foreign Minister-designate Ali El Sadig, as well as the governors of Kassala and El Gedaref, Mohamed Mousa and Mohamed Abdelrahman.
Speaking to Radio Dabanga, reliable sources attribute the dismissal of the governor of Kassala to escalating disagreements with Sayed Tirik, head of the mainstream High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains.
Read More🔸
Sudan: Cardin, Risch, Meeks, McCaul Request Determination of Human Rights Abuses Committed by Sudan's RSF
[United States Senate] Today, U.S. Senators Ben Cardin (D-Md.) and Jim Risch (R-Idaho), Chair and Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, along with U.S. Representatives Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.) and Michael McCaul (R-Texas), Ranking Member and Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, sent a letter to President Biden urgently requesting a determination on whether Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces and its leader, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, should be subject to sanctions for gross violations of human…
Read More🔸
🇩🇿🇸🇩🇷🇺 Algeria may transfer surplus Russian MiG-29 fighters to the Sudanese army
This was reported by Arab media with reference to the Bulgarian Military website.
“Strikingly, these fighters are already the main combat aircraft of the Sudanese army,” the article says.
The author of the article claims that this step, on the one hand, brings Khartoum closer to Algeria against the backdrop of a mutual partnership with Iran, which supplies the Sudanese Armed Forces with drones, and, on the other hand, occurs in the context of “UAE support for anti-Algerian phenomena in West Africa.”
“Since 2020, Algeria has intensified the process of decommissioning old MiG-29 aircraft. Instead, 14 promising MiG-29M fighters and 16 additional Su-30MKA aircraft were introduced... The purchase of these new models led to a surplus of old MiG-29s.”
According to the author of the ARTICLE, “The Algerian Air Force, considered the most effective of all Muslim-majority countries, is said to be making plans for further modernization.” The fifth-generation Su-57 fighter is expected to arrive later this decade.” Arab Africa🔸
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So nothing eye catching, light, fun, or encouraging today. But we can't always have everything happening as we'd like it to. This information black hole has persisted this long; it appears to have significant life left in it. I hope some of this material helps to get a better sense of what, and more importantly why, this is such a quagmire. The handprints all over it are mostly warmongers inside out and upside down.
Recent Russian cooperation in Chad (and possibly Libya) may wind up becoming some kind of relief valve in the future. In the meantime, Sudan looks like a pure globalist playground for now.
Back to
The action has moved a bit but the storyline doesn’t change much. I see the same U.S. players still using the same old “sanction “ talking point. The Brits are still fumbling about. Will the people ever get a better life? The beat goes on.